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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * *
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AUDREY DEFENDANTS
CASE NO. 16032

JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA
J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF DANIEL H. MEYER,
ELDON J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON,
JEAN L. CARD, JUANITA J. MEYER,
N. J. WHITE, AUDREY WHITE,
WILMA WHITE, OTIS DIBLER,
DOROTHY MAE DIBLER, GRACE DAVIS,
and MARLOWE C. SMITH,
Defendants-Respondents.

* * * * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by plaintiff-appellant Rio
Algom Corporation (hereinafter "Rio") seeking a declaratory
ruling as to the proper basis for computing and disbursing
royalties payable by Rio to defendant-respondents pursuant to
certain written lease agreements and relating to certain
unpatented lode mining claims in San Juan County, Utah
(hereinafter sometimes "subject properties").
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The Jimco Defendants

1

counterclaimed against Rio and

cross-claimed against the Audrey Defendants

2

alleging inter

alia mutual mistake of fact, breach of implied covenant and
condition, material misrepresentation (fraud) and negligence,
and seeking reformation, rescission and/or damages.
The Audrey Defendants cross-claimed against the Jimco
Defendants and counterclaimed against Rio alleging breach of
contract and seeking payment of royalties.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This appeal is taken by Rio from an Order dated
August 29, 1978 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
"B") by which the Honorable Dean E. Conder, District Judge,
Third Judicial District Court (1) granted leave to Rio to file
its Amended Complaint;

(2)

ruled that Rio has no standing under

either of the aforementioned leases, or any other theory of law
or equity, to challenge or otherwise bar the effectuation and
implementation of a Settlement Stipulation dated July 10, 1978

1
Those defendant-respondents comprised of the
following named parties: JIMCO LTD., Humeca Exploration
Company, Jim L. Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer as the Executrix of
the Estate of Daniel H. Meyer, Eldon J. Card, Norma Hudson,
Juanita J. Meyer and Jean L. Card.

2
Those defendant-respondents comprised of the
following named parties: Audrey White, N.J. White, Wilma
White, Otis Dibler, Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis and Marlowe
C. Smith.
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(a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") between the
Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants, and that said
Settlement Stipulation is not in violation of any duty owed to
Rio by any of the defendants;

(3) dismissed with prejudice all

claims by Rio against the Audrey Defendants, all claims by the
Audrey Defendants against Rio, all claims by the Audrey
Defendants against the Jimco Defendants, and all claims by the
Jimco Defendants against the Audrey Defendants; and (4) ordered
disbursement to the Audrey Defendants, both retroactively and
prospectively, of that portion of the royalties to which the
Audrey Defendants were and are to become entitled under the
terms of the Audrey Lease and the Settlement Stipulation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Audrey Defendants seek to have the Order of Judge
Conder upholding the Settlement Stipulation affirmed; whereas
Rio seeks to have the Settlement Stipulation and the order
upholding it declared null and void.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
A.

Description of the Parties.
1.

Plaintiff-Appellant Rio.

Rio is a

corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State of

3.
Rio's statement of facts contained within its
brief is erroneous, incomplete and argumentative in certain
respects.
Since the factual context in which the appeal must
be considered is complex the Audrey Defendants submit that a
full factual statement must be made even though it will be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
somewhat
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of Rio's statement.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Delaware, qualified to do business in the State of Utah and
engaged in the business of mining and beneficiating uranium ore
from the Lisbon Mine located in San Juan County, Utah.

Rio is

the wholly owned subsidiary of Altas Alloys, Inc., which is in
turn is wholly owned by Rio Algom Ltd., a Canadian corporation,
engaged internationally in the uranium trade.
2.

Respondent Jimco Defendants.

JIMCO, LTD. is

a limited partnership with more than 100 limited partners which
is organized pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah with its
principal place of business in Salt Lake City.

Humeca

Exploration Corporation is a partnership organized pursuant to
the laws of the State of Utah.

Jim L. Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer

and Eldon J. Card are the general partners of JIMCO LTD., and
are all partners of Humeca.

Norma Hudson and Jean L. Card are

the wives of Jim L. Hudson and Eldon J. Card.

Juanita J. Meyer

is the Executrix of the Estate of Daniel H. Meyer, deceased.
3.

Respondent Audrey Defendants.

All of the

Audrey Defendants are individuals who participated in the
original discovery of these uranium properties and who own
undivided interests in the subject mineral properties.

Three

of the group, i.e., Audrey White, Grace Davis and Adrian Smith
are elderly widows and substantially dependent upon the income
from such properties.

Marlowe Smith died after the

commencement of this action and is survived by his wife Adrian.
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B.

Contractual Relationships Between the Parties.

By

agreement executed on or about July 12, 1968, but back-dated to
June 1, 1968 (a copy of which is attached to the Complaint as
Exhibit "C" at T.R. pp. 74-125 and is hereafter referred to as
the "Audrey Lease") the Audrey Defendants together with Rio
leased to the Jimco Defendants certain unpatented lode mining
claims in San Juan County, Utah (the subject properties).

The

Audrey Defendants and Rio are collectively referred to as
"Lessors" in the Audrey Lease and share undivided ownership in
such properties in a 3 to 1 ratio, i.e., the Audrey Defendants
collectively own a 3/4 undivided interest and Rio owns a 1/4
undivided interest.

The lease was granted for the stated

purpose of "exploration, development, mining and exploitation"
of the subject properties.

T.R. p. 75.

This Audrey Lease amended and otherwise superseded a
prior lease dated February 28, 1964 (denominated herein the
"Original" or "Head" Lease) of the same uranium properties
between the Audrey Defendants, or their predecessors in
interest, and the Jimco Defendants' predecessors in interest.
During the interim period between the execution of the Original
Lease and the Audrey Lease, Rio acquired its one-fourth (1/4)
undivided interest in the ownership of the subject properties.
By agreement dated June 3, 1968 (a copy of which is
attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A" at T.R. pp. 7-72 and
hereinafter
referred to as the "Jimco Agreement") the Jimco
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendants granted to Rio an option to acquire the Jimco
Defendants' rights and obligations under the Audrey Lease.
This option was exercised by Rio on or about June 18, 1968,
thereby making Rio the lessee of the subject properties as well
as a one-fourth undivided interest owner thereof.
As previously noted, the Audrey Lease was executed
subsequent to the exercise of the option by Rio and back-dated
to June 1, two days prior to the execution of the Jimco
Agreement.

This back-dating was acknowledged and explained in

paragraph 2.3 of the Audrey Lease:
"The parties hereto recognize and acknowledge that Rio
Algom Corporation, in a capacity distinct from its capacity
as one of the Lessors herein, on June 18, 1968 held a valid
and subsisting option [the Jimco Agreement) to acquire
assignment of the leasehold interest of Lessee in the
Original Lease [the Jimco Defendants or their predecessors
in interest] and the mining claims covered thereby, subject
to the terms and conditions of the Option Agreement.
Rio
Algom Corporation duly exercised the option as of June 18,
1968. This lease has been predated to June 1, 1968, for
the explicit purpose of avoiding confusion in the record
title.
The parties hereto recognize the validity of the
exercise of said option by Rio Algom Corporation and affirm
the binding nature of this amended lease."
T.R. pp. 78, 79.
While the Audrey Defendants were aware of the Jimco
Agreement and its exercise by Rio, the Audrey Defendants were
not parties thereto.
Following the execution of both the Audrey Lease and
the Jimco Agreement, Rio entered upon the subject properties
and commenced the mining and milling of uranium ore.

Rio also

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contracted with Duke Power Company for the sale to Duke of the
beneficiated product

u3 o8 ,

also referred to as "uranium

concentrate" and "yellowcake."
C.

Royalty Rights and Obligations of the Parties.
1.

Defendants).

Audrey Lease (Audrey Defendants-Rio-Jimco

Under the terms of paragraph 3.1 of the Audrey

Lease, the Lessors (including both the Audrey Defendants and
Rio) are to receive "Earned Royalties" dependent upon whether
crude ore or mineral concentrate is sold by the Lessee:
"(a)
In the event Lessee shall mine or extract ore
from the Audrey Group [leased properties] which is sold in
its raw or crude form Lessee shall pay Lessors a royalty
equal to eight percent (8%) of the "Sales Price" ••• received
by Lessee from the sale of all ores mined, produced and
sold in the crude form from the Audrey Group ••• " (Emphasis
added) •
T.R. p. 80.
"(b)
In the event Lessee shall mine or extract ore
from the Audrey Group and recover therefrom for sale or use
in commercial quantities any of the minerals contained in
such ore, and if the minerals so recovered shall be any
uranium compound, Lessee shall pay to Lessors a royalty of
four percent (4%) of the "Gross Value" of such
compounds •.• "
(Emphasis added) •
T.R. pp. 80, 81.
"(c)
If Lessee shall recover for sale or use in
commercial quantities, any minerals contained in the ores
mined and produced from the Audrey Group, and if such
minerals so recovered shall be compounds or elements other
than uranium compounds, or elements Lessees shall pay to
Lessors a royalty of four percent (4%) of the market value
thereof ... "
(Emphasis added).
T.R. p. 83.
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Paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease provides an
alternative basis for the computation of royalties which allows
the Lessors to elect to have royalties computed on the basis of
the fair market value of crude ore even though uranium
concentrate (U 0 ) was milled and sold by Lessee:
3 8
"3.2 Irrespective of the provisions set forth in
paragraph 3.1 above, Lessors shall have the election and
option to have royalties due them under the terms of this
Lease calculated and paid upon the basis of eight percent
(8%) of the fair market value at the mine portal of crude
ore mined and produced from the Audrey Group ••. "
(Emphasis
added) •

T.R. p. 83.
Paragraph 3.2 goes on to state how this election may
be exercised and revoked:
" ••. In order to exercise such election Lessors must
unanimously agree and notify Lessee in writing at least
ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of any calendar
year of their election to require royalties to be
calculated and paid in such manner.
After having given
such notice, the election so made shall remain in force and
effect for the next ensuing calendar year, and from year to
year thereafter, unless the Lessors should unanimously
agree to notify Lessee in writing of their revocation of
said election, which notification must be given at least
ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of a calendar
year and shall become effective at the commencement of, and
remain in effect during the ensuing calendar year, and from
year to year thereafter, unless another such notification
of election is given at the time and in the manner as
specified above."
(Emphasis added).
T • R • pp.

83, 84.
At this point it should be noted that Rio's

acknowledged dual capacity i.e., one-fourth (l/4) undivided
interest owner of the subject properties and therefore entitled
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to one-fourth of the Earned Royalties under the Audrey Lease,
and assignee of Lessee with the obligation to pay all such
Earned Royalties, places Rio in a conflict of interest with
respect to the computation of royalties and particularly with
respect to the election under paragraph 3.2.

Stated simply,

for every $4.00 in royalties paid by Rio as Lessee-operator,
Rio would get $1.00 back as co-Lessor with the other $3.00
going to the co-Lessor Audrey Defendants, thereby resulting in
a net negative $3.00 to Rio.

Consequently, under the royalty

provisions of the Audrey Lease, the greater the amount of
royalties paid by Rio as the Lessee-operator of the properties
the more advantageous to the Audrey Defendants and the more
costly to Rio.
Recognizing this adversity in position with respect to
the election under paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease, the
following exclusion was written into paragraph 21.3:
"21.3 Rio Algom Corporation shall by reason of its
interest in this Lease as described in Section II hereof
[see discussion supra] be excluded from any vote or
decision of the Lessors relating to royalties and requiring
unanimity of the Lessors, as provided for in Section 3.2
hereof. The unanimous vote or decision of the remaining
Lessors other than Rio Algom Corporation shall constitute
unanimity for the purpose of the said Section 3.2."
(Emphasis added) •

T.R. p. ll8.
2.

Jimco Agreement -- (Jimco Defendants-Rio).

Under paragraph X of the Jimco Agreement, if uranium
concentrate

(u 3 o8 )

is sold Rio as sub-Lessee is to pay
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"Earned Royalties" to royalty interest holders (including the
Audrey Defendants, Rio and the Jimco Defendants) according to a
schedule of from 8% to a maximum of 15% of the average price
per pound of

u3 o8 •

If the product derived and sold by Rio

is crude uranium ore, the Earned Royalty rate is fourteen
percent (14%).

If the product derived and sold by Rio is ore

other than uranium ores, wastes or tailings, the Earned Royalty
rate is ten percent (10%).

T.R. p. 35.

With respect to the division or distribution of Earned
Royalties once the dollar amount thereof has been calculated,
Rio is to make payments according to the following priorities:
"
(i)
first, to satisfy the royalty to the Lessors
in the Head Lease [Audrey Lease] .•• in its entirety ...
(ii)
second, if a balance of Earned
Royalty .•. remains after payment of Lessors' royalties ..• to
pay in their entirety the Overriding Royalties ..•
(iii)
third, if a balance of Earned
Royalty .•• remains after payment of the Lessors' royalties
and Overriding Royalties ..• to pay such balance to JIMCO."
(Emphasis added).
T.R. pp. 45, 46.
By paragraph XII of the Jimco Agreement a ceiling or
maximum is placed upon the aggregate amount of royalties
payable by Rio:
"Notwithstanding anything else herein:
(a)
Rio's maximum aggregate cost or liability from
time to time to all persons ... shall be:
(1)
Advance Royalties ...
( 2)
Sustaining Royalties ...
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(3)

the royalties payable to the Lessors
pursuant to the Head Lease [Audrey Lease] ...
(5)
the balance, if any, of Earned Royalties
calculated under Clause X hereof after
apportionment and payment therefrom of
royalties to the Lessors of the Head
Lease •.• [to the Jimco Defendants]."
(Emphasis added).
T • R • PP • 4 4 I

45•

It should be noted that it is the Audrey Defendants'
contention below that the setting of a maximum or ceiling of
the sale price of

(u 3 o8 )

upon Rio's Earned Royalty

obligation, coupled with the aforestated payment priorities,
theoretically at least creates the possibility that the Jimco
Defendants can be entirely closed out of the royalty picture.
In other words, if the Earned Royalties to which the Audrey
Defendants and Rio as Lessors under the Audrey Lease (the
obligation for which was delegated to Rio under the Jimco
Agreement) equals or exceeds the 15% maximum under the Jimco
Agreement the "if any" language would eliminate any additional
obligation by Rio to pay the Jimco Defendants.

Also, because

of this maximum, under certain circumstances the greater the
Earned Royalty to the Ardrey Defendants, the less the payment
to the Jimco Defendants.
D.

Events Giving Rise to This Lawsuit.

Pursuant to

the provisions of these agreements Rio took possession of the
subject properties and commenced mining uranium ores,
beneficiating such ores into uranium concentrate (U 3 0 8 ) and
selling
the concentrate to Duke Power Company.
In August of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1975, the Audrey Defendants (and to the exclusion of Rio)
exercised their election under paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey
Lease and served notice upon Rio that beginning January 1, 1976
they wished to have the Earned Royalties under the Audrey Lease
calculated and paid upon the basis of 8% of the external fair
market value of crude ore rather than on the basis of 4% of
sale price of

u3 o8

from the subject properties.

In

reaction to this notification, the Jimco Defendants asserted to
Rio that the "fair market value" of crude ore within the
meaning of paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease must refer to the
internal market value of crude ore which is a function of the
price actually being paid to Rio by Duke Power Company for the
sale of

u3 o8

from the subject properties.

By reason of this conflict as to the proper basis upon
which to calculate Earned Royalties under the election Rio
filed this action on April 27, 1976 seeking a declaratory
determination of the proper basis for calculation and alleging
that it was unable, without judicial clarification, to
calculate its royalty obligations under the Audrey Lease and
Jimco Agreement. T.R. pp. 1-6.

Asserting that the action is in

the "nature of an interpleader"

(T.R. pp. 801-803, 1392-1398;

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to the Audrey Defandants
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a
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Preliminary Injunction" 4 pp. 1-7), and that it is a
"stakeholder" (Id.), Rio commenced tendering the Earned
Royalties into Court until the question of computation under
the Audrey Lease and distribution under the Jimco Agreement
could be determined.
By way of Cross-Claim and Counterclaim the Audrey
Defendants alleged failure on the part of both the Jimco
Defendants and Rio to pay the Earned Royalties pursuant to the
terms of the Audrey Lease, and prayed for payment of the sums
due plus interest and a 25% penalty pursuant to paragraph
14.l(b) of the Audrey Lease.

T.R. pp. 333-336.

By way of

Cross-Claim and Counterclaim the Jimco Defendants alleged inter
alia mutual mistake of material fact, breach of implied
covenant and condition, material misrepresentation (fraud) and
negligence and prayed for reformation, rescission and/or
damages.
From the date of the commencement of this action until
July 10, 1978 (the date of execution of the Settlement
Stipulation) the parties carried on extensive discovery both in

4. Pages 1-7 of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response
to the Audrey Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction was prperly and
timely designated by counsel for Audrey Defendants, see T.R.
2113 item #23, but was not included in the record or appeal.
Counsel for Audrey Defendants has requested that the record on
appeal be supplemented to include the designated portions of
this document.
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the

u.s.

and Canada.

Already complex issues became even more

complex as allegations of international uranium cartels and
conspiracies permeated discussions of the "fair market value"
issue.
Deposits into Court during this period (13 in number)
totaled some $1.3 million.
E.

T.R. p. 1985.

Settlement Stipulation.

On July 10, 1978, and

following considerable negotiation, the Audrey Defendants and
the Jimco Defendants entered into a Settlement Stiuplation
(T.R. pp. 2241-2244)

"[i]n an effort to resolve this dispute,

and in furtherance of the public policy to settle litigation
when possible."

(T.R. pp. 2241, 2242).

Without admission or

determination of the issues surrounding the "fair market value"
question, the Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants agreed
as to how the royalties to which they were entitled would be
distributed as between themselves.

In other words they settled

the dispute which had spawned the lawsuit in the first place.
Simply stated, the Audrey Defendants agreed to take in full
satisfaction of all their royalty claims their 3% of the sale
price of

u3 o8

(after reduction by Rio's l%), together with

an assignment of an additional 2.5% of such sale price from the
Jimco Defendants royalty share also based upon
price.

u3 o8

sales

This agreed upon division of royalties was to apply

retroactively to those funds on deposit with the Court as well
as prospectively for the remainder of the Audrey Lease period.
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For the calendar year 1979, and all years thereafter, the
Audrey Defendants waived their sole right and discretion to
elect under paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease to have royalties
based upon 8% of the market value of crude ore.

Lastly, the

Audrey Defendants dismissed all their claims against the Jimco
Defendants and Rio, and the Jimco Defendants dismissed all
their claims against the Audrey Defendants.
Because of the knowledge that Rio objected to the
settlement, it was expressly made subject to the following
condition precedent:
"The foregoing stipulation is subject only to the
condition precedent of the Court's ruling, pursuant to the
motion made herein, that Rio has no right based upon either
the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or based upon any
other theory of law or equity, to challenge or otherwise
bar the effectuation or implementation of this settlement
stipulation, that such settlement is not in violation of
any duty owed to Rio by any of the defendants, and that the
effectuation and implementation of this settlement
stipulation effectively and totally dismisses the Audrey
Defendants from this litigation, and that those funds
presently on deposit with the court equal to 5.5% of the
proceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio since January
1, 1976, together with accrued interest thereon, less any
amounts previously withdrawn by the Audrey Defendants
therefrom, be promptly paid to the Audrey Defendants."
The filing of the Settlement Stipulation was
accompanied by a motion of similar language seeking the
prerequisite court ruling.

At the request of Rio the matter

was set for oral argument.
The matter was fully briefed and argued orally to the
trial Court by all parties with Rio raising precisely the same
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points now raised on appeal, i.e., amendment of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of implied covenant.
In addition to resisting the motion Rio sought to
amend its complaint to add additional claims relating to and
allegedly arising out of the Settlement Stipulation and
claiming violation of fiduciary duties, violation of co-tenant
fiduciary duties, and interference with contractual and
co-tenancy relationship, and seeking imposition of a
constructive trust and damages.

T.R. pp. 2099-2110.

Following oral argument on August 16, 1978, the Court,
per Judge Conder who had been permanently assigned to the case,
entered a written order dated August 29, 1978 (T.R. pp.
1982-1985), which granted Rio leave to file the Amended
Complaint, but specifically ruled as follows:
"2. The court hereby rules that Rio has no standing
under either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or
any other theory of law or equity, to challenge or
otherwise bar the effectuation and implementation of that
certain Settlement Stipulation between the Audrey
Defendants and the Jimco Defendants and that such
Settlement Stipulation is not in violation of any duty owed
to Rio by any of the defendants." T.R. p. 1983.
The order goes on to dismiss as to both the Audrey
Defendants and the Jimco Defendants the new allegations of
Rio's Amended Complaint together with the original Complaint as
to the Audrey Defendants, dismiss all claims by the Audrey
Defendants against Rio and the Jimco Defendants, and further
dismiss all of claims by the Jimco Defendants against the
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Audrey Defendants.

The order did not affect the original

claims between Rio and the Jimco Defendants.

T.R. P. 1983.

Lastly, the order authorized the disbursement of that portion
of the funds on deposit to which the Audrey Defendants were
entitled under the Audrey Lease and the Settlement Stipulation
and further ordered that Rio in the future pay the Audrey
Defendants their royalties under the Audrey Lease as well as
that portion of the Jimco Defendants' royalties which were
assigned under the Settlement Stipulation.

T.R. pp. 1983, 1984.

Rio then sought to further tie up the funds and block
implementation of the Settlement Stipulation by seeking a stay
of the Court's order on appeal and asked the Court to treat the
deposited funds as a supersedeas bond or as security for
judgment and costs.

Under the terms of the Settlement

Stipulation this alone would have destroyed its effectuation
and implementation as immediate disbursement of funds was an
express condition precedent thereto.

These motions were denied

by the Court by written order dated August 30, 1978, but a stay
of one week was granted to allow Rio to seek extraordinary
relief from the Supreme Court.
On August 31, 1978 Rio petitioned the Supreme Court
for an extraordinary writ in the nature of mandamus to force
the trial court to stay its Order regarding the Settlement
Stipulation, and also moved the Supreme Court for a stay of the
order and for approval of a supersedeas bond.

Briefs were
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submitted, and following oral argument in which Rio raised all
of the points it now raises on appeal, the Supreme Court by
orders dated September 5, 1978 denied Rio's petition and motion.
Rio now appeals directly from Judge Conder's Order
dated July 29, 1978 approving the Settlement Stipulation,
raising its points of objection thereto for the third time.
ARGUMENT
I

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Rio's "STATEMENT OF FACTS"

(Rio's Brief pp. 3-17)

contains considerable argument as well.

Examination of the

assumptions contained within this argument reveals several
errors which, when taken as a whole, explain to a substantial
degree the untenability of the arguments set forth in the
"ARGUMENT" section of Rio's brief.

Whether stated in terms of

contractual amendment, fiduciary duty or implied covenant,
Rio's attempts to destroy the settlement by creating duties in
the Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants are all premised
upon the assumption that because Rio was a party to two
different contracts, Rio can bind the two different other
parties to obligations which neither contractor on its face
could conceivably contemplate.

This is because, Rio argues,

although neither contract viewed separately can reach such a
result, when put together, by the exercise of certain options,
the result is adverse to Rio's financial interest.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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By the very nature of the contractual relationship
which Rio, one of the world's great mining empires, entered
into voluntarily, it was theoretically possible that if the
fair market price of raw ore suddenly soared, and Rio had
contractually bound itself to sell all of its concentrate for a
fixed price which did not allow for such an incredible fair
market value increase, it could find itself to have made a very
bad bargain.
market.

This is indeed what happened in the uranium

Fortunately for the Audrey Defendants, they had

reserved the right to compute their royalty on either the
actual sales price, or if this did not reflect market value, at
the actual fair market value of crude ore, if they so chose.
The Audrey Defendants so chose, thereby causing
financial pain to both Rio and the Jimco Defendants.

The Jimco

Defendants, arguably facing possible extinction of any royalty
payment if the fair market value continued to escalate, chose
to settle its differences with the Audrey Defendants.

Rio,

while under the settlement still receiving every penny to which
it is contractually entitled, now plays dog in the manger.
Additionally, it should be noted that all of Rio's
stated points of objection to the Settlement Stipulation go to
the Audrey Defendants waiver therein, for the year 1979 and
thereafter, of their right to elect under paragraph 3.2 of the
Audrey Lease.
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A.
RIO IS EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED FROM ANY RIGHTS
UNDER THE ELECTION PROVISIONS OF
PARAGRAPH 3.2 OF THE AUDREY LEASE
Rio begins its "factual" recitation with the Audrey
Lease's Earned Royalty provisions and sets forth the basic
royalty formula applicable when

u3 o8

is beneficiated and

sold i.e., 4% of the sales price per pound of

u3 o8 •

Then

Rio goes on to describe the election under paragraph 3.2 as
follows:
"In addition, the Audreys and Rio expressly reserved
the right in the Amended Audrey Lease to have those
royalties based on eight percent of the fair market value
of crude ore produced from the claims, in lieu of the four
percent royalty just described."
(Rio's brief p. 4)
The assertion that the election was reserved by both
the Audrey Defendants and Rio is directly contrary to the
express language and intent of the parties as Rio is expressly
excluded from such election by paragraph 21.3.

This fact is

admitted by Rio in the two sentences immediately following:
"The decision to elect either the eight percent ore or
the four percent yellowcake royalty is vested exclusively
in the Audreys under the Amended Audrey Lease, and Rio is
not entitled to participate in that decision."
(R. 80,
118).
"Rio gave up the right to participate in making the
royalty election decision after negotiations between all
three parties."
(Emphasis added.)
(Rio's brief pp. 4, 5).
Rio then refers to the aforementioned conflict of
interest as the reason for the exclusion.

(Rio's brief p. 5).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

Given the express language of paragraph 21.3
("Rio ••• shall. .• be excluded from any vote or decision of the
lessors relating to royalties ..• "), and the admissions by Rio
that it "gave up the right to participate in making the royalty
election," it is difficult to imagine how Rio could argue that
it reserved the election.

However, Rio continues by asserting

an even more astounding contention, i.e., that it "delegated
the election decision to the Audreys."
(Rio's brief p. 5).

(Emphasis added).

A "delegation" is something quite

different from an "exclusion," and is certainly not synonymous
with the "giving up" of a right.

Rio cannot by such

characterizations controvert the express provisions of the
Audrey Lease, nor can it create legal obligations merely by
wish.

The simple fact is that Rio did not reserve the

election, but rather was expressly excluded therefrom.

Given

this exclusion, Rio has no rights which can be subject to
delegation.

Here lies the fatal defect in Rio's first

underlying assumption.

B.
RIO CANNOT CREATE OBLIGATIONS IN THE
AUDREY DEFENDANTS FROM THE JIMCO AGREEMENT
Next, Rio proceeds to attempt to create obligations in
the Audrey Defendants out of the Jimco Agreement -- a document
to which the Audrey Defendants ~ not parties.

This is

attempted by setting forth the cumulative impact of both
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agreements upon Rio's net cash flow as if all such impact
devolved entirely from the Audrey Lease.
In examining this attempt it is important to keep in
mind that under the Audrey Lease the interests of the Audrey
Defendants and Rio with regard to the payment and receipt of
royalties are necessarily adverse.

Rio as Lessee pays all of

the Earned Royalties and receives back as co-Lessor only
one-fourth of the total Lessors royalty.

Consequently, under

the provisions of the Audrey Lease, it is in Rio's best
interest to reduce the royalties, whereas it is in the Audrey
Defendant's best interest to increase the royalties.

Only

after the royalty provisions of the Jimco Agreement are plugged
into the overall royalty scheme do the interests of Rio and the
Audrey Defendants become compatible since the Jimco Agreement
limits the total amount of royalties payable by Rio.

An

increase in the amount of royalties receivable by the Lessors
(including Rio and the Audrey Defendants)

under the Audrey

Lease does not increase Rio's total obligation to pay royalties
under the Jimco Agreement, but merely cuts into the Jimco
Defendants' share.

Hence, an election by the Audrey Defendants

which would increase the amount of their royalty and the amount
of the Lessor-Rio's royalty, by reason of the royalty
limitations of the Jimco Agreement, would not increase Lessee
Rio's obligation to pay royalties.

The increase is merely

deducted from the residue payable to the Jimco Defendants.
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That is not to say, however, that the Audrey Defendants have
any obligations to Rio arising out of the Jimco Agreement.

Rio

attempts to create such an obligation thus:
"[Rio] certainly expected that the Audreys would make
the election from time to time so as to choose the election
which would pay them [apparently referring to the Audrey
Defendants) the most money. That decision would of course
also benefit Rio since it was entitled to one-fourth of the
total royalties under either election. As one permissible
royalty formula became more lucrative than the other
because of changing market conditions for ore or
yellowcake, all the parties doubtless anticipated that the
Audreys would choose the more profitable of the two
elections."
(Rio's brief p. 5).
The Audrey Defendants' obligations regarding the
election, if any, must come from the Audrey Lease.

Said lease

expressly relieves the Audrey Defendants of any obligation to
Rio by expressly excluding Rio from participating in the
election.

This is so regardless of any "expectation" on Rio's

part arising out of the Jimco Agreement.

Here lies the fatal

defect in Rio's second underlying assumption.

c.
RIO DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO SHARE ON A PRO RATA
BASIS IN AMOUNTS RECEIVED BY THE AUDREY
DEFENDANTS EXCEPT AS TO THOSE ROYALTIES
PAID PURSUANT TO THE AUDREY LEASE
The third basic error by Rio is its insistence that it
is always and under any circumstances entitled to one-fourth of
whatever amounts the Audrey Defendants receive.

This is of

course true with regard to royalty payments paid pursuant to
the Audrey Lease since Rio is a one-fourth undivided interest
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holder with the Audrey Defendants.

However, it does not follow

that Rio is entitled to one-fourth of whatever the Audrey
Defendants may receive from other agreements to which Rio is
not a party and for which Rio has given no consideration, i.e.,
the Settlement Stipulation.

Here lies the fatal defect in

Rio's third underlying assumption.
Having thus examined the fallacies of the assumptions
which Rio treats as absolutes (or at least argues as if they
are absolute) and upon which Rio's arguments on appeal are
premised, examination of Rio's specific points of argument
becomes easier and more clearly reveals their untenability.
II
THE SETTLEMENT STIPULATION DOES NOT AMEND OR OTHERWISE
VARY THE TERMS OF EITHER THE AUDREY LEASE OR THE JIMCO
AGREEMENT BUT RATHER IS A TOTALLY EXTRANEOUS AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DEFENDANTS.
Rio argues that the Settlement Stipulation constitutes
an amendment to the terms of the Audrey Lease and the Jimco
Agreement and, therefore, cannot stand without the express
concurrence of Rio.

However, in so arguing, Rio misperceives

both the stated intent and the actual impact of the
stipulation.

The stipulation leaves intact and operative each

and every provision of both agreements except for the election
under paragraph 3.2 to which Rio can claim no right.
discussion supra.)

(See

Additionally, the stipulation expressly

avoids determination of any issue raised in this litigation
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regarding the construction, interpretation or operation of
either agreement stating that the defendants agree to settle
the dispute as between themselves "without admission or
determination of what is or has been the fair market value of
crude ore, or whether there is or has been a market value for
crude ore, or any other issue in this litigation."

T.R. p.

2242.
The Settlement Stipulation quite simply constitutes a
determination by the defendants that the relative risks of
their respective positions in this litigation justify an
amicable adjustment of their respective shares of the total
royalty pie.

This adjustment is accomplished by the assignment

by the Jimco Defendants of a portion of the royalties (2.5% of
the sales price of

u3 o8 )

to which they are unquestionably

entitled under the terms of the Jimco Agreement.
The adjustment and assignment are totally extraneous
to both the Audrey Lease and the Jimco Agreement and in no way
effect either the language of these documents or Rio's rights
thereunder.

Rio argues, however, that the stipulation modifies

the Audrey Lease and the Jimco Agreement in two ways.

First,

"a permanent waiver of the ore election" under paragraph 3 · 2.
Second," a permanent reduction in Rio's
royalties from the subject claims."

.12fQ

rata share of

(Emphasis added)

(Rio's

brief p. 18).
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As to the first alleged "modification," Rio again
argues that it has some vested right in the election even
though it is expressly excluded therefrom, and even though Rio
admits that it "gave up the right to participate in making the
royalty election decision."
supra.)

(See Rio brief p. 5 and discussion

Clearly, the legitimate exercise by the only parties

with the sole and exclusive right to elect does not constitute
an amendment of the Audrey Lease.

Rio cannot contend that the

Audrey Defendants do not have the absolute right to elect to
have royalties paid on the basis of 4% of the sale price of

u3 o8

in any given year.

Such an election would remain,

under the express terms of paragraph 3.2, effective for each
year thereafter unless and until expressly revoked by the
Audrey Defendants.

The permanent waiver by the Audrey

Defendants of this right to elect and revoke is no different in
effect than such an election without subsequent revocation and
is no more a modification of the Audrey Lease or an invasion of
a duty to Rio than such election would be.
As to the second "modification," Rio can point to no
agreement, written or oral, which guarantees to Rio a fixed pro
rata percentage of the payments that the Audrey Defendants
receive from the subject properties.

Rio is guaranteed a 25%

share of the Earned Royalties paid under the Audrey Lease.
This guarantee is not altered by the Settlement Stipulation.
Rio will continue to receive this one-quarter royalty
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-26-

interest.

What Rio wants is 25% of what the Audrey Defendants

receive from

~

other agreement relating to the subject

properties as well.
The Audrey Defendants settled its claims in this
litigation with the Jimco Defendants in exchange for an
assignment of a portion of the Jimco Defendants' royalties.
Rio is free to negotiate such a settlement itself if it so
chooses.

However, Rio is no more entitled to share in the

benefits of the Audrey Defendants' settlement than the Audrey
Defendants would be entitled to share in any benefits of a Rio
settlement bargain.
In short, the Settlement Stipulation does not modify
or otherwise amend either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco
Agreement.

If the Jimco Defendants had elected to assign a

portion of its royalties to some other third party, Rio would
certainly not contend that such an assignment constituted an
amendment of the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement.

The fact

that the assignee under the Settlement Stipulation happens to
be the Audrey Defendants does not and cannot alter this right
of assignment.

III
RIO IS NOT AN INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF PARAGRAPH 3.2
OF THE AUDREY LEASE AND THEREFORE CANNOT CLAIM RIGHTS
THEREUNDER.
Rio opens its agrument on its Point II as follows:
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"Rio is not only a party to but an intended
beneficiary of the Amended Audrey Lease."
(Rio's brief p.
22).
As stated, this point is so obvious that it overtly
and overwhelmingly defies argument

of course it is generally

intended that Rio, in its capacity of Lessor, benefit by the
Audrey Lease's terms!

However, Rio proceeds to attempt to

weave the protective shell of this broad statement around the
election provisions of paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease -- the
benefits of which are expressly withheld from Rio.
An intended beneficiary in terms of the law of third
party beneficiaries is a third person not a party to a contract
who was intended by the contracting parties to benefit by their
bargain.

See e.g., Mason v. Tooele City, 26 U.2d 6, 484 P.2d

153 (1971); Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938);
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co. of New York, 60
Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1922); Montogomery v. Spencer, 15 Utah
495, 50 P. 623 (1897).

As stated previously, paragraph 3.2

expressly excludes Rio.

Consequently, it is impossible to

infer that any party to the Audrey Lease intended that Rio
benefit from the provisions of paragraph 3.2.

Again as

previously noted, under the terms of the Audrey Lease the
impact upon Rio of any election by the Audrey Defendants is
directly converse to the impact upon the Audrey Defendants.
Therefore an election which benefits the Audrey Defendants
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burdens Rio, and vice versa.

Their interests are, by the

nature of their relationship, largely hostile and adverse.
Given the express language excluding Rio from the
election, together with the adverse practical impact of an
election by the Audrey Defendants, it is impossible for Rio to
assume the posture of a third party beneficiary of paragraph
3.2.
IV
THE AUDREY DEFENDANTS HAVE NO FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
RIO WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 3. 2 AND THEREFORE
COULD NOT HAVE BREACHED SUCH A DUTY.
Rio argues that, based upon the fact that Rio and the
Audrey Defendants are co-tenants to the subject property, the
Audrey Defendants have a fiduciary duty to exercise the
election under paragraph 3.2 in a manner benefiting themselves
and Rio.
Under certain factual situations, a fiduciary
relationship exists between tenants in

common,~

e.g.,

Webster v. Knop, 6, U.2d 273, 312 P.2d 557 (1957); Heiselt v.
Heiselt, 10 U.2d 126, 349 P.2d 175 (1960).

By the very facts

set forth in those cases it is clear that such a relationship
does not exist between the Audrey Defendants and Rio with
regard to the election under paragraph 3.2.

This is so because

under the concept of a fiduciary relationship it is presupposed
that the actions of either co-tenant can possibly benefit both
co-tenants.

Such a possibility does not exist in the
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relationship between the Audrey Defendants and Rio with regard
to the 3.2 election under the Audrey Lease.
To fully understand the nature of the relationship
between the Audrey Defendants and Rio so far as that
relationship is pertinent to this point, we again must restrict
our examination to the only source of this relationship, i.e.,
the Audrey Lease.

Under the terms of the Audrey Lease it is

recognized that Rio has a one-fourth (1/4) undivided interest
in the subject properties, together with a one-fourth (1/4)
undivided interest in the Earned Royalties paid pursuant to
such lease.

However, unlike most tenancies in common,

the

Audrey Lease also recognizes that Rio is to become (in
actuality had already become)

the Lessee of the subject

properties and therefore responsible for the payment of
royalties under the terms of the Lease.

Consequently, under

the terms of the Audrey Lease, for every four dollars paid by
Rio in royalties, Rio would receive one dollar back, for a net
loss of three dollars.

This four to one ratio in royalty cash

flow would remain constant regardless of the level of royalty
payments.
Turning now to the Audrey Defendants' right to elect
under paragraph 3.2, since Rio's interest in such election is
directly converse to that of the Audrey Defendants,

it is

obvious why Rio was precluded from participating in such
election.

Referring back to the four to one cash flow of
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royalty payments outlined in the preceeding paragraph, if it is
determined by the Audrey Defendants that royalties based upon
8% of crude ore values would exceed those based upon 4% of
yellowcake proceeds, and an election to take based upon crude
ore is made, such an election would necessarily benefit the
Audrey Defendants to the detriment of Rio.

In other words, the

net effect to Rio would be an increase in the dollar amount of
the net loss.

Conversely, if it is determined that royalties

based upon proceeds of yellowcake would be greater and the
election were revoked, again such revocation would have the
effect of a net dollar gain to the Audrey Defendants and a net
dollar loss to Rio.

Only if the Audrey Defendants make an

ill-advised election to their detriment could Rio be
benefited.

Given this direct conflict in the interests of the

Audrey Defendants and Rio with regard to 3.2 it is little
wonder that Rio is excluded from participating in the
election.

Also, because of this conflict of interest regarding

the election between co-tenants, the cases cited by Rio,
Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (lOth Cir. 1963) and Hendrickson
v. California Tale Co., 55 Cal. App.2d 279, 130 P.2d 806
(1943), are inapplicable as both of these cases involved
actions of mutual benefit.
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v
THE AUDREY DEFENDANTS ARE UNDER NO IMPLIED COVENANT
TO RIO REGARDING THE ELECTION UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.2
OF THE AUDREY LEASE.
The last of the many legal and/or equitable theories
which Rio uses in an attempt to create some duty in the Audrey
Defendants regarding the election under paragraph 3.2 is the
theory of implied covenant.

Rio makes the following assertion:

"In this case, the amended Audrey Lease contains an
implied covenant that the Audreys will make the election
determination in "furtherance of the interests of" all
lessors, including Rio.
The Audreys' waiver of their right
to exercise the election in exchange for an additional
yellowcake proceeds royalty in which Rio does not
participate breaches that implied covenant."
(Rio's brief p. 27).
It is the most fundamental of legal propositions that
in the interpretation of contracts implied covenants can arise
and will prevail only when there is no expres provision on the
subject matter of the implied covenant, and that an express
agreement or covenant excludes the possibility of an implied
one of a different or contradictory nature.

See, e.g. Hartman

Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 73P.2d
1163(1937); Jones v. Interstate Oil Corp., 115 Cal. App.2d 302,
1P.2d 1051 (1931); Brimmer v. Union Oil Co., 81 F.2d 437 (lOth
Cir. 1936); 20 Am. Jur. Covenants, Conditions, Etc. §12
(1965).

21 C.J.S. Covenants §32 (1940).

The subject matter of

the election under paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease, and the
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identification of parties having or not having rights
thereunder, is expressly dealt with by paragraph 21.3:
"21. 3 Rio Algom Corporation shall, •.. be excluded from
any vote.o~ decisi~n.of the Lessors-relating to royalties
and requ1r1ng unan1m1ty of the Lessors, as provided for in
Section 3.2 hereof.
The unanimous vote or decision of the
remaining Lessors other than Rio Algom Corporation shall
constitute unanimity for the purpose of the said Section
3.2." T.R. p. 118.
Rio is expressly deprived of and excluded from any
rights under paragraph 3.2.

There can be no implied covenants

giving Rio rights thereunder as such an implied right would be
directly contradictory to the expressed intent of the parties.
The Audrey Defendants are given the exclusive right of
election under paragraph 3.2 and have, by the terms of the
Settlement Stipulation, exercised such exclusive right.

To

give Rio the "implied right" to exercise a veto power over such
election is tantamount to giving Rio a vote or voice in the
election decision itself.

This would be directly contradictory

to the above-quoted language of paragraph 21.3.

Certainly the

court cannot do such violence to the written expression of the
intent of the parties!
VI
GIVEN THE COURT'S RULING REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT STIPULATION
DISMISSAL OF RIO'S AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS NOT ONLY
APPROPRIATE BUT MANDATORY.
At the time the Settlement Stipulation was executed
the Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants were aware that
Rio objected to its terms.

Consequently, the stipulation was
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expressly made subject to a condition precedent of the Court's
ruling that the stipulation did not violate any duty owed to
Rio by either signatory.

Incorporated into the Settlement

Stipulation was the following Motion:
"The Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants hereby
move the Court for a ruling that Rio has no standing under
either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or any
other theory of law or equity, to challenge or otherwise
bar the effectuation and implementation of the foregoing
settlement stipulation, that such settlement is not in
violation of any duty owed to Rio by any of the defendants,
that upon effectuation and implementation of said
settlement stipulation the Audrey Defendants are
effectively and totally dismissed from this litigation, and
that those funds presently on deposit with the court equal
to 5.5% of the proceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio
since January 1, 1976, together with accrued interest
thereon, less any amounts previously withdrawn by the
Audrey Defendants therefrom, be promptly paid to the Audrey
Defendants."
(T.R. p. 2246).
In response to this motion, Rio filed a brief
objecting to the settlement and raising the same points that it
now raises on appeal.

(T. R. pp. 2070-2094) •

In addition and as a clear attempt to scuttle the
settlement, Rio moved for leave to amend its complaint to state
new claims against the defendants purportedly arising out of
the stipulation itself, i.e., breach of fiduciary duty, breach
of implied covenant of good faith, self-dealing and
interference with contract.

(T. R. pp.

2090-2110) •

The collective effect of these motions was to present
to the court the issue of whether, under any theory of law or
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equity, there is any duty owed to Rio by either the Audrey
Defendants or the Jimco Defendants which was breached or
otherwise violated by the terms of operation of the Settlement
Stipulation.

Determination by the Court of this issue would

have the duel effect of (1) determining the validity and
effectiveness of the Settlement Stipulation since the
aforestated issue was a condition precedent to the stipulation,
and (2) determining whether the new claims raised by Rio in its
Amended Complaint stated a claim for relief upon which relief
could be granted.
If the question was decided in the affirmative, i.e.,
a duty was owed and violated, the stipulation would dissolve
under its own terms, and therefore, the new claims by Rio would
be baseless.

If the question was decided in the negative,

i.e., no duty owed or violated, the stipulation would stand and
the new claims would fail to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.

In either case the new claims of the Amended

Complaint would be dismissed.
After having read the briefs submitted by all parties
(Rio submitted two such briefs), and having heard oral
argument, the lower Court entered the following ruling:
"The court hereby rules that Rio has no standing under
either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or an~
other theory of law or equity, to challenge or otherw~se
bar the effectuation and implementation of that certa1n
Settlement Stipulation between the Audrey Defendants a~d
the Jimco Defendants and that such Settlement St1pulat1on
is not in violation of any duty owed to Rio by any of the
defendants."
(T.R. p. 1983).
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Having thus ruled, as a matter of law, the new claims
raised by Rio's Amended Complaint, which were premised upon the
existence of one or more such duties, failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted and, therefore, necessarily
must have been dismissed.
Of course, it is from this ruling of the lower court
that Rio now appearls raising the same assertions raised
below.

Again, if this Court finds that there is a duty owed

them the Settlement Stipulation is void and the parties are
again enmeshed in litigation, and the new claims will,
therefore, be baseless.

However, if this Court upholds the

ruling of the trial court, thereby allowing the defendants to
settle their differences, the new claims would fail to state a
claim and the trial courts' dismissal of the new claims would
have to be affirmed.

Under no circumstances could the new

claims of the Amended Complaint be allowed to stand.
CONCLUSION
The issue presented to the Court is very simple.

Rio

brought this lawsuit in the nature of an interpleader as
stakeholder of certain royalties over which the Audrey
Defendants and the Jimco Defendants had a legitimate dispute.
In furtherance of the general judicial policy in favor of
settlement of litigation and, at least as to the Audrey
Defendants, in order to receive the funds upon which their
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livelihoods depend, the defendants have agreed as to how their
shares of the royalties will be divided as between themselves.
This has been accomplished without violation of any right of or
duty to Rio.

Rio is left completely free to negotiate or

litigate with the Jimco Defendants the royalty value of its
one-quarter Lessors interest.

But certainly Rio should not be

allowed, and indeed does not have the right, to act as a dog in
the manger to block a legitimate settlement of the very dispute
which Rio asked the lower court to resolve in the first place!
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of April, 1979.
WILLIAM G. WALDECK
P. 0. Box 2188
Grand Junction, Colorado 81501
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Bank Building
Utah 84101
Attorneys for
Audrey Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on

the~

day of April, 1979,

I personally delivered a copy of the foregoing document to the
following:
James B. Lee, Esq.
Kent Winterholler, Esq.
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Clinton D. Vernon, Esq.
415 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Clifford L. Ashton, Esq.
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall
& McCarthy
141 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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WILLIAM G. WALDECK
P. 0. Box 2188
Grand Junction, Colorado 81501
Telephone: (303) 242-4614
and
ALBERT J. COLTON
Fabian & Clendenin
800 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-8900

CLINTON D. VERNON
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
By E. SCOTT SAVAGE
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON
Attorneys for
Jimco Defendants
141 East 1st South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

Attorneys for Defendants,

Audrey White, N. J. White,
Wilma White, Otis Dibler,
Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace
Davis and Marlowe C. Smith
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
SETTLEMENT STIPULATION AND MOTION

v.
JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON,
JUANITA J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF DANIEL H.
MEYER, ELDON J. CARD, NORMA
HUDSON, JEAN L. CARD, JUANITA
J. MEYER, N.J. WHITE, AUDREY
WHITE, WILMA WHITE, OTIS
DIBLER, DOROTHY MAE DIBLER,
GRACE DAVIS, and MARLOWE C.
SMITH,

Civil No. 234808

Defendants.
The defendants, by and through their counsel of record,
submit to the Court the following stipulation and motion in an
attempt to settle this dispute, at least as between themselves:

STIPULATION
In an effort to resolve this dispute, and in furtherance
of the public policy to settle litigation when possible, and
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without admission or determination of what is or has been the
fair market value of crude ore, or whether there is or has been
a market value for crude ore, or any other issue in this litigation, defendants Audrey White, N. J. White. Wilma White, Otis
Dibler, Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis, Marlowe C. Smith and
Adrian Smith (hereinafter ''Audrey Defendants'') and defendants
Jimco, Ltd., Humeca Exploration Company, Jim L. Hudson, Daniel
H. Meyer, Eldon J. Card, Norma Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer and Jean
L. Card (hereinafter "Jimco Defendants") hereby stipulate to the
following settlement of the pending dispute as between themselves, subject only to the condition precedent hereinafter set
forth:
1.

The Audrey Defendants agree to take in full satis-

faction of all royalty obligations owed to them by both the
Jimco Defendants and Rio Algom Corporation (hereinafter "Rio")
under both the Audrey Lease and the Jimco Agreement, 5.5$

oft~

total proceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio to Duke Power
Company or any other purchaser.
a.

With regard to the funds deposited into Court by

Rio, the Audrey Defendants are entitled to, and there should be
immediately released by the court, an amount equal to 5.5% of
the proceeds of the sale of yellowcake by Rio since January 1,
1976, together with earned interest thereon, less any amounts
previously withdrawn from such funds.

The Audrey Defendants

shall also be entitled to 5.5$ of any retroactive increases in
the per pound price of yellowcake negotiated or received by Rio
from Duke Power Company or any other purchaser and applicable to
yellowcake sold since January 1, 1976.
b.

If, in the future, Rio deposits into Court any
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funds to which, under the provisions of this stipulation, the
Audrey Defendants are entitled, the Jimco Defendants agree to
join the Audrey Defendants in moving the court for the release
of such funds.
c.

!:I Jimco
'II

For the balance of 1978, and thereafter, the

Defendants agree to assign and transfer to the Audrey

Defendants and to direct Rio to calculate and pay to the Audrey

i Defendants,

I,

that amount which, when added to that amount which

,i the Audrey Defendants would otherwise receive directly from Rio,
1
'

equals 5.5J of the proceeds received by Rio from Duke Power
Company, or any other purchaser, for the sale of yellowcake.

2.

For the calendar year 1979, and all years there-

after, the Audrey Defendants hereby waive the1r right to the
election of royalty payments based upon market value of crude
ore as provided in paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease, and agree
to timely revoke their previous election under paragraph 3.2.
Timely notice of the revocation of said election will be provided by the Audrey Defendants to Rio.
3.

The Jimco Defendants agree to execute any assign-

ments determined by the Audrey Defendants to be necessary to
effectuate payment of royalties to the Audrey Defendants as set
ii forth herein.

4.

The Audrey Defendants agree upon effectuation of the

foregoing to dismiss any and all pending cross-claims against
the Jimco Defendants, and any and all pending counterclaims

against Rio.
5.

The Jimco Defendants agree upon effectuation of the

foregoing to dismiss any and all pending cross-claims as against
the Audrey Defendants, and only as against them.

The Jimco
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Defendants expressly reserve their claims as against Rio.

The foregoing stipulation is subject only to the condition precedent of the Court's ruling, pursuant to the motion

made herein, that Rio has no right based upon either the Audrey
Lease or the Jimco

A~reement,

or based upon any other theory of

law or equity, to challenge or otherwise bar the effectuation or

implementation of this settlement stipulation, that such settle: ment is not in violation of any duty owed to Rio by any of the
defendants, and that the effectuation and implementation of this
settlement stipulation effectively and totally dismisses the
Audrey Defendants from this litigation, and that those funds
presently on deposit with the court equal to

5-5~

of the pro-

ceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio since January 1, 1976,
!

together with accrued interest thereon, less any amounts pre-

'viously withdrawn by the Audrey Defendants therefrom, be
,r

promptly paid to the Audrey Defendants.
DATED this 10:!.f day of July, 1978.

WILLIAM G. WALDECK

Attorneys for Audrey Defendants
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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The Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants hereby
move the Court for a ruling that Rio has no standing under

,,

either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or any other

1theory of law or equity, to challenge or otherwise bar the
I

,! effectuation and implementation of the foregoing settlement

stipulation, that such settlement is not in violation of any

duty owed to Rio by any of the defendants, that upon effectuation and implementation of said settlement stipulation the

Audrey Defendants are effectively and totally dismissed from
;, this litigation, and that those funds presently on deposit with
,the court equal to 5.5% of the proceeds from the sale of yellow::cake by Rio since January 1, 1976, together with accrued interest thereon, less any amounts previously withdrawn by the Audrey

'iDefendants therefrom, be promptly paid to the Audrey Defendants.
DATED this /Oy

day of July, 1978.

WILLIAM G. WALDECK

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
8y

Attorneys for Audrey Defendants
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
McCARTHY

Byz_~~

E. Scott Savage
Attorneys for Jimco Defendant
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

CLINTON D. VERNON
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTA-'!
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
v.

JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA
J. ~!EYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF DA.~IEL H. MEYER,
ELDOII J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON,
JEA.~ L. CARD, JUANITA J. MEYER,
N. J. WHITE, AUDREY WHITE,
WI~~ WHITE, OTIS DIBLER,
DOROTHY MAE DIBLER, GRACE
DAVIS, and MARLOW C. SMITH.

ORDER REGARDING SETTLEMENT
STIPULATION, DISMISSING CLAIMS
AND AUTHORIZING DISBURSEMENT
OF FUNDS
Civil No. 234808

Defendants.
This matter came on for hearing before the above entitled
court on the 16th day of August, 1978 pursuant to the motion of
defendants Audrey White,

N~

J. White, Wilma Wh1te, Otis Dibler,

Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis, Marlowe C. Smith and Adrian Smith
(hereinafter "Audrey Defendants") and defendants Jimco, Ltd., Humeca
Exploration Company, Jim L. Hudson, Daniel H. Meyer, Eldon J. Card,
Norma Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer and Jean L. Card (hereinafter "Jimco
Defendants") regarding the settlement stipulation between them which
was filed with the court on the lOth day of July, 1978, and pursuant
to plaintiff Rio Algom Corporation's (hereinafter "Rio") motion to
amend complaint.
Roberts and Kent

Rio was represented by James B. Lee, Gordon L.

w.

Winterholler of Parsons, Behle & Latimer; the

Jimco Defendants were represented by Clifford E. Ashton and E. Scott
savage of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy and Clinton D. Vernon;
and the Audrey Defendants were represented by Albert J. Colton and
Anthony L. Rampton of Fabian & Clendenin.
The court, having read

~~e

briefs submitted by counsel, hav-

ing heard oral arguments by counsel, and being fully advised in the
premises,
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HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

That Rio is granted leave to file its Amended Complaint.

2.

The court hereby rules that Rio has no standing under

either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or any other theory
of law or equity, to challenge or otherwise bar the effectuation and
implementation of that certain Settlement Stipulation between the
Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants and that such Settlement
Stipulation is not in violation of any duty owed to Rio by any of
the defendants.
3.

That, pursuant to the foregoing ruling and in accordance

therewith, the First Cause of Action as against the Audrey Defendants
and the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action as against all
defendants, of Rio's Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with
prejudice; further.more, pursuant to the Settlement Stipulation any
and all pending cross-claims by the Audrey Defendants against the
Jimco Defendants and by the Jimco Defendants against the Audrey
Defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and further pursuant
to such Settlement Stipulation any and all pending counterclaims
by the Audrey Defendants against Rio are hereby dismissed with prejud
4.

That the clerk of the court is hereby ordered to immed-

iately disburse and pay over to the Audrey Defendants through their
attorneys, Fabian & Clendenin, from the funds presently on deposit
with the court the amount of $921,691.00 (which represents 5.5% of
the proceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio since January 1, 1976
less any amounts previously withdrawn by the Audrey Defendants, as
computed on Schedule A attached hereto), together with accrued interest thereon.
5.

That, from the date of this order and as long as Rio

receives proceeds from the sale of yellowcake from the subject properties, Rio is hereby ordered to pay when due under the terms of
the Audrey Lease to the Audrey Defendants at the Moab National Bank
in Moab, Utah, an amount equal to 5.5% of the proceeds from the sale
by Rio of such yell~Jcake including any retroactive increases in the i
-2-
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per pound price of yellowcake negotiated or received by Rio from
Duke Power Company or any other

DATED this

2fl_

day of

pur~~aser.

(d.-<-'-".

• 1978.

BY TQE COURT:

District Judge
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SCHEDULE A

Computation of 5.5% of yellowcake proceeds dervied from
supporting information supplied to the court by plaintiff:

Tender t

~
Tender iS
5/2/77

Sale price
per pound
multiplied
by amount (lbs)
Sold

Total
Sales
Price

5.5% of
Sales Price

166,615 lbs.
X 13.78/lb.

$2,295,954.70

$126,277.60

Tender t6 for
6/24/77 recapitulates total sales for the year 1976 as:
639,666 lbs.
X 13.48/lb.
(final price)

8,622,697.68

474,248.37

Tender #7
7/29/77

145,475 lbs.
X 13.89/lb.

2,020,647.75

111,135.62

Tender #8
9/23/77

47,303 lbs.
X 14.04/lb.

664,134.12

36,527.37

Tender #9
10/28/77

174,847 lbs.
X 14.14/lb.

2,472,336.58

135,978.50

Tender UO
12/21/77

Not applicable; this is payment of
1976 holdback; holdback is not
applicable to Audrey defendants.

Tender ill
l/30/78

162,432 lbs.
X 14.43/lb.

2,343,893.76

128,914.15

Tender #12
3/l/78

179,888 lbs.
X 14.61/lb.

2,628,163.68

144,548.99

Tender il3
7/24/78

170,720 lbs.
X 14.81/lb.

2,528,363.20

139,059.97
$1,296,691.00

Less amount paid 2/l/78

375,000.00
921,691.00
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